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Abstract
It is highly difficult to pinpoint what is going through an animal’s mind when it appears to
solve a problem by ‘insight’. Here, we searched for an information processing error during
the emergence of seemingly insightful stone dropping in New Caledonian crows. We pre-
sented these birds with the platform apparatus, where a heavy object needs to be dropped
down a tube and onto a platform in order to trigger the release of food. Our results show
New Caledonian crows exhibit a weight inattention error: they do not attend to the weight of
an object when innovating stone dropping. This suggests that these crows do not use an
understanding of force when solving the platform task in a seemingly insightful manner. Our
findings showcase the power of the signature-testing approach, where experiments search
for information processing biases, errors and limits, in order to make strong inferences
about the functioning of animal minds.
Introduction
When faced with a difficult problem, humans can often spend a prolonged period of time try-
ing to solve the problem without success, only for the solution to arrive suddenly and unex-
pectedly, often accompanied by a subjective ‘aha’ moment. Such ‘insightful’ problem solving is
an implicit process. where the problem is restructured following the impasse [1,2], though it is
not yet clear exactly what cognitive mechanisms humans use during this process [3,4]. Since
Kohler’s research with apes at the beginning of the 20th century [5], there has been debate over
whether or not animals are also capable of insight [1,6,7]. How insight is defined in the animal
cognition literature varies; one widely used definition, from Thorpe [8], states that insight
occurs with “the sudden production of a new adaptive response not arrived at by trial-and-
error behaviour”, while more recent definitions are more mechanistic, emphasising the impor-
tance of concepts such as mental models, means-end understanding, and causal knowledge in
producing insightful behaviour [9–11].
A number of different bird behaviours fit these definitions of insight, including string pull-
ing [11], solutions of the Aesop’s fable task [6] and solutions of the von Bayern paradigm [12].
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In the string pulling task, birds have to pull up a string which is hanging from a perch in order
to obtain the reward at the end of it. Some birds, such as keas [13], neo-tropical parrots [14],
and corvids [11], can solve this task on their first trial. This fits Thorpe’s definition, as adaptive
behaviour is produced without any evidence of trial and error learning. However, an alterna-
tive explanation for this success is a perceptual-motor feedback loop [15]. Pulling and stepping
on the string can act as a reinforcer, as it moves the food closer to the bird, and so provides
reinforcement for the bird to repeat these behaviours. In one experiment exploring this alter-
native explanation [15], the crows’ visual access to the food was restricted, and in another, the
strings were laid horizontally and looped so that the initial pulls on the strings did not move
the food [16]. In both experiments, the feedback loop was disrupted and the crows’ perfor-
mance on the task was drastically reduced.
Another example of potential animal insight is the Aesop’s Fable paradigm, where animals
have to raise the water level in a container via displacement in order to obtain a reward. Chim-
panzees and orang-utans have been shown to solve this task by spitting additional water into
the container [17,18], whilst rooks dropped stones into the container in order to raise the
water level [6]. The cognitive mechanisms behind both the apes’ and rooks’ success are
unclear. For the apes, it is difficult to know whether they planned a solution based on a causal
understanding of displacement or tried out various behaviours in their behavioural repertoire
until they happened upon a solution. For the rooks, it is unclear if subjects were not simply
repeating a learned response, given they had learnt to stone-drop in a previous experiment
[19].
Solution of the von Bayern paradigm is also an example of seemingly ‘insightful’ behaviour.
Similarly to the results of the Aesop’s fable experiments, after receiving experience of pushing
down a platform with their beak, New Caledonian crows will then drop stones down a tube
positioned above the platform in order to trigger it [12]. This spontaneous innovation of stone
dropping can be described as ‘insightful’ as it emerges without trial and error learning and so
fits Thorpe’s definition. Two hypotheses have been proposed to explain the crows’ perfor-
mances [12,20,21]. One possibility is that the birds use an understanding of force; that is, they
learn from pushing the platform with their beak that pressure needs to be applied to the plat-
form for it to trigger. By coupling this understanding with knowledge that heavy, falling
objects also exert sufficient force, the birds realise that stone dropping gains them the out-of-
reach food. An alternate possibility is that the birds learn that contact between their beak and
the platform leads to it triggering. They then attempt to recreate this contact by dropping an
object external to their body onto the platform.
As can be seen from the above studies, there are a number of competing hypotheses for
many recent examples of animal ‘insight’. This has led to a growing call for comparative psy-
chologists to move beyond describing seemingly ‘insightful’ behaviour in non-human animals
[19,22,7,23]. Instead it has been suggested that researchers attempt to pinpoint the actual cog-
nitive mechanisms being used by an animal during problem solving [21,24–26]. One powerful
way to do this is to use the ‘signature–testing approach’ [26]. Inspired by Alan Turing’s work
on machine intelligence [27], this attempts to make inferences about thought processes by not
only examining problem solving successes, but also the information processing biases, errors
and limits made by an individual. If a potential cognitive mechanism does not predict the pres-
ence of these observed signatures it is unlikely to be generating the behaviour in question.
Thus the presence and absence of these signatures constrains the type of cognitive mechanism
that can be producing behaviour, allowing for stronger inferences to be made about the type of
cognitive process used by an animal during problem solving.
One particular cognitive signature, the ‘weight inattention error’, can be used to test
between the two hypotheses explaining crows’ ‘insightful’ performances on the von Bayern
New Caledonian Crows Do Not Attend to Object Weight
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0167419 December 14, 2016 2 / 12
paradigm. The contact hypothesis predicts that crows should be insensitive to object weight as
their understanding of the task is based only on the need for contact between an object and the
platform. In contrast, if the crows have an understanding of force, they should understand that
the weight of an object is important for successfully collapsing the platform and so prefer
heavy objects to light objects when innovating stone dropping. Therefore, determining
whether this information processing error is present or absent in New Caledonian crows is a
powerful way to explore the cognitive mechanisms behind crows’ ‘insightful’ solutions of this
task. In this study, we first gave New Caledonian crows experience of pushing a platform with
their beaks, as in von Bayern et al [12], before examining whether our subjects chose heavy,
functional objects when they began spontaneously dropping stones onto a platform, or if they
made the weight inattention error.
Methods
Ethics statement
This study was conducted under approval from the University of Auckland ethics committee
(reference no. R602). The Province Sud granted us permission to work on Grande Terre, New
Caledonia and to capture and release crows (Permit No.2962-2015/ARR/DENV). All birds
were released at their site of capture at the end of testing.
Subjects
Subjects were twelve wild-caught New Caledonian crows, captured from various sites across
Grande Terre. The birds were housed in an eleven-cage outdoor aviary before being released.
All cages were at least 2m2 x 3m. The crows were housed in the aviary on three separate occa-
sions. The first group were housed in the aviary from April to November 2014, the second
group were housed in the aviary from April to August 2014 and the final group were housed
there from April to August 2016. All crows were captured by whoosh nets. The area around
the whoosh net was baited until groups of crows were feeding regularly on it. The whoosh net
was then released when a family group was present. Sexing and ageing were carried out using
methods from Kenward et al, 2004 [28] Six of the twelve crows were adults. Nine of the birds
were male: four juveniles and five adults. Three of the birds were female: two juveniles and 1
adult (see Table 1 for details.) Crows were fed a diet of papaya, meat, dog biscuits and egg
daily, and had access to water ad libitum.
Materials
The platform apparatus was a Perspex box (180x110x85mm) with a 90mm tube (inner
diameter = 40mm) on top and a platform inside held up by a magnet. This apparatus functions
as follows: when a heavy object is dropped down the tube it falls onto the platform, which
causes the platform to collapse and the meat sitting on the platform to fall out of the apparatus
(Fig 1B). The blocks were 30mm x 20mm x 10mm, weighed either 15g or 1g and were coloured
either purple or pink. These colours were chosen because crows are tetrachromatic and so can
discriminate colour [29–31], the colours pink and purple did not have any obvious ecological
correlates which may induce preference or aversion, and because past work had shown the
crows could distinguish between them (AHT pers. obv.) The plastic tubes used to habituate
the crows to moving the blocks were 120mm x 120mm x 60mm, while the Perspex tubes
used for the object preference pre-test were 150mm high, with an inner diameter of 40mm.
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Procedure
Birds were randomly allocated to two groups. For Group 1 the purple blocks were heavy across
all stages of our experiment, while for Group 2 the pink blocks were heavy. While the heavy
blocks were of sufficient weight to trigger the platform apparatus, the light ones were not.
Habituation
Crows were habituated to the purple and pink blocks by placing food underneath two blocks,
one of each colour. Habituation continued until neophobic responses towards the objects
stopped. They were then habituated to moving the blocks with their beaks by placing the
blocks in clear plastic containers with food underneath so that the birds had to move the blocks
out of the way to access the food.
Object handling pre-test
To ensure the crows had no preference to handle blocks of one colour or weight we gave them
20 object handling trials. Here, food was placed in a plastic bottle top with a 3cm handle. This
food holder was then placed in a vertical, Perspex tube and three blocks of one colour were
stacked on top of it (Fig 1A). Crows had to pull three blocks out of the tube to be able to pull
the container out by its handle and so gain the food. A second tube was set up 30cm away,
with three blocks of the other colour stacked on top of the baited container. Block type was
pseudo-randomised between tubes, across trials. While both tubes were always baited, the
crows were only allowed to gain food from one tube. If the crows interacted with one tube and
then attempted to interact with the other tube, the experimenter entered and removed the sec-
ond tube before the crow could access the food. If crows had a preference for objects of a par-
ticular colour or weight, we expected them to choose the tube containing the objects they
preferred at above chance levels.
von Bayern platform pushing procedure
Crows were tested following the methodology outlined in von Bayern et al. [12]. The birds
were habituated to the platform apparatus by placing meat beside and on top of the apparatus.
Table 1. Crows’ pre-test block preferences.
Identity Adult or Juvenile Sex Number of trials Number of heavy block choices
D4B Adult Male 20 6
D4R Juvenile Female 20 10
D3R Juvenile Female 20 10
D3B Juvenile Male 20 9
RWY Adult Male 20 8
Sort Adult Male 20 9
Svart Juvenile Male 20 8
Den Juvenile Male 20 10
Black Juvenile Male 20 9
Nero Adult Male 20 9
Preto Adult Male 20 9
Noir Adult Female 20 15*
The number of times across 20 trials that the crows picked the tube containing heavy blocks to obtain the reward.
*p<0.05
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0167419.t001
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The length of time required for the birds to habituate to the apparatus varied among individu-
als but occurred over the course of 1–4 habituation sessions across 1–2 days. Crows received
habituation trials until they were comfortable approaching the apparatus. After habituation to
the platform apparatus, the crows were trained with this apparatus without the 90mm tube on
top. Here, crows had to push the platform with their beaks to gain food placed out-of-reach on
the platform. Crows initially learnt to take food from the box when the platform was open and
then closed. Once, they were confident at taking food from the box, a small bit of meat was
placed between the magnets holding the platform and another piece of meat was placed out of
reach of the crows. The birds’ pecking at the trapped meat caused the platform to collapse and
allowed the crows access to both pieces of meat. As the birds became more comfortable col-
lapsing the platform, the size of the meat placed between the magnets was reduced. When the
birds were confidently collapsing the platform, the meat between the magnets was removed
and the birds had to continue to push the platform with their beaks to retrieve the inaccessible
meat. As in von Bayern et al. [12], once crows had pushed the platform with their beak to gain
the reward 30 times they began the experiment.
Fig 1. Diagram of platform apparatus and object pre-handling pretest apparatus. A. Illustrates the set
up for object pre-handing pretest. One tube contained heavy blocks and the other contained light blocks. The
birds had to pull the blocks out of the tube in order to retrieve the reward. Birds were allowed to obtain the
reward from one tube. If birds had a preference for the heavy or light blocks, they should approach the
corresponding tube at above chance levels. B. The platform apparatus. When the birds pecked the platform, it
collapsed and the birds could access the food.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0167419.g001
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Block dropping experiment
During testing, the tube was placed back on the platform apparatus and, in each trial, 10
blocks, 5 of each colour were arranged around it, with one block of each colour placed in alter-
nating pairs (Fig 2). Within each pair the position of each block was randomised across trials.
While the heavy objects were of sufficient weight to trigger the platform apparatus if dropped
down the tube, the light objects were not. A test trial began when a crow landed on the table
and ended when the crows got the food or after 3 minutes. Crows were given 3 trials initially.
At the end of these 3 trials, if the crows had not solved the task, they were given another 5 trials
of pushing the platform with their beak. They were then given an experimental trial. If they
did not drop a block again, this pattern was then repeated a further time before testing ended.
For crows that did solve the task, testing ended once they had gained the reward by dropping
the block in 10 trials.
Stone dropping training and preference test
Crows that did not complete the experiment were subsequently given training where they
learnt to drop a stone down the tube. Training consisted of the crows learning to nudge the
stone from the edge of the tube onto the platform. Initially meat was placed on the stone so
that, as the crows took the meat, the stone fell into the tube. Over time, as the crows learnt to
nudge the stone, the stone was placed progressively further from the tube. When the crows
were reliably nudging the stone onto the platform, the stone was placed on the ground so that
the crows had to pick it up and drop it in. Once the crows had picked up the stone from the
ground and used it to gain the reward 10 times, they were then given the experimental test
again, to see if they had developed a preference for the heavy block after learning to stone
drop.
Fig 2. Set up of the blocks and platform apparatus during test trials. Ten blocks (five light and five
heavy) were placed in pairs around the platform apparatus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0167419.g002
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Results
Object handling pre-test
In the object handling pre-test, birds chose to pull the light blocks out of their tube slightly
more often than pulling blocks from the tube containing heavy blocks, doing so in 128 of
the 240 trials given (20 trials per bird). This preference was not significant (Binomial test
p = 0.167; Table 1). Individually, only one bird had a significant preference for either block;
picking the heavy block 15 times out of 20 (Binomial test p = 0.041.) The other birds had no
significant preference for either block (see Table 1 for details.)
Block dropping experiment
During the block dropping experiment, only two of the twelve crows produced the target
block dropping behaviour. On her second trial, D4R dropped one light block down the tube,
and then dropped one heavy block, triggering the platform. Across the 10 experimental trials
this bird dropped the heavy object 12 times and the light object 22 times and so showed a
non-significant trend to drop the light block (Binomial test p = 0.062, see S1 Video for exam-
ple). D3B dropped the light object once on the first trial and then stopped stone dropping,
though he did interact with the blocks on a further 5 trials. During these trials he interacted
significantly more with the light block than the heavy block (18/24 contacts Binomial test
(p = 0.012). The remaining ten birds did not drop the blocks down the tube across the experi-
ment, though seven individuals did interact with them. Nineteen of the 30 total contacts with
the blocks were with the light one (Binomial test p = 0.100). Individual crow interactions are
summarized in Table 2.
Stone dropping training and preference test
In the subsequent test, all of the birds that did not complete the experiment learnt to stone
drop after shaping. All of these birds then showed a significant preference for the heavy block
after having successfully stone dropped 10 times, with three crows scoring 10/10 immediately
Table 2. Summary of crows’ interactions with blocks during test.
Identity Adult or Juvenile Sex No. of Interactions No. of blocks dropped into tube
Heavy Light Heavy Light
D4B Adult Male 0 0 0 0
D4R Juvenile Female 13 26* 12 22
D3R Juvenile Female 0 1 0 0
D3B Juvenile Male 6 18* 0 1
RWY Adult Male 2 1 0 0
Sort Adult Male 0 0 0 0
Svart Juvenile Male 2 0 0 0
Den Juvenile Male 3 10* 0 0
Black Juvenile Male 3 3 0 0
Nero Adult Male 0 3 0 0
Preto Adult Male 0 0 0 0
Noir Adult Female 1 1 0 0
The number of times the crows interacted with the blocks and the number of blocks dropped into the tubes by the crows
*p<0.05
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0167419.t002
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(see Table 3 for details). As a group the crows showed a significant preference to drop the
heavy block, choosing it on 125/140 trials (Binomial test p<0.001).
Discussion
The two birds in our study that spontaneously dropped blocks onto the platform to release
food did not choose to drop heavy blocks onto a platform and so clearly did not attend to
information on object weight (the weight inattention error). One bird dropped the stone only
once, likely because the initial dropping of the light block was not followed by reward. The
other crow continued stone dropping for the 10 trials of the experiment, without showing any
preference for heavy blocks. In contrast, the ten birds that did not complete the experimental
task all showed significant preferences for the heavy block after being trained to stone drop.
These birds’ behaviour demonstrates that the errors made by the two crows who innovated
block dropping were not due to the crows being unable to detect a difference in weight
between the two blocks provided, or being unable to inhibit responses towards the lighter
blocks. After experience, these crows discriminated between the blocks and were able to imme-
diately inhibit actions towards the non-functional one with three crows scoring 10/10 at this
task. Instead, it seems the crows lacked the necessary experience to know that block weight
was an important piece of information that needed to be attended to. With experience of stone
dropping they did attend to weight, and so made functional choices. Our findings therefore
demonstrate that attention to weight is not necessary for the production of seemingly ‘insight-
ful’ stone-dropping in New Caledonian crows. Instead, these crows make a specific informa-
tion processing error when creating spontaneous stone dropping: the weight inattention error.
The proportion of birds who showed spontaneous stone-dropping was lower in our experi-
ment than the original von Bayern et al experiment [12]. One possible reason for this differ-
ence is that the crows in the original study may have learned to insert their beak into the tube
during the stone dropping phase due to having to insert their beak into a 3cm tube in order to
collapse the platform in the training phase. In contrast, in our study, the tube was removed
from the apparatus when the birds had to collapse the platform with their beak. While this
Table 3. Summary of crows’ post-training first choice preferences.
Identity Adult or Juvenile Sex No. of trials No. of heavy first choices
D4B Adult Female 10 9*
D3R Juvenile Male 10 9*
D3B Juvenile Male 20 18***
RWY Adult Male 10 10***
Sort Adult Male 10 10***
Svart Juvenile Male 20 17**
Den Juvenile Male 10 9*
Black Juvenile Male 10 9*
Nero Adult Male 20 15*
Preto Adult Male 10 9*
Noir Adult Female 10 10***
The number of trials in which the crows first picked up the heavy block after completing stone dropping training. Birds were initially given 10 trials. If the
crows chose the heavy block significantly more than expected by chance (9/10), testing stopped. If they did not, a further 10 trials were given.
*p<0.05
**p<0.01
***p<0.001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0167419.t003
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small difference in apparatus design should have had no effect on innovation rates if the crows
were using an understanding of force, it could have if stone dropping is innovated through
simpler mechanisms, as our results here suggest. Another possible reason for the difference in
the number of birds which innovated stone dropping in the two experiments is that two of the
three birds that spontaneously stone dropped in the von Bayern et al experiment were raised
in captivity. In a similar manner to the “captivity bias” seen in apes, where captive apes show
greater use of tools than wild apes [32], it is possible that these captive crows experienced
reduced task demands compared to the wild birds in our study. In particular, they may have
devoted less of their cognitive resources to vigilance behaviour, due to their lack of experience
of life in the wild and thus found the task easier to solve.
While stone dropping was only innovated by two of the twelve birds tested, these results do
suggest that the anecdote reported in von Bayern et al [12], of a crow dropping a feather down
the tube, was not due to play or a lack of alternative options, but reflected a limit in their
understanding of the task. The presence of the weight inattention error suggests that the beak
pushing experience given to the crows in our study did not lead to them developing a full
causal understanding of the stone dropping task. Clearly, an understanding of force is not nec-
essary for New Caledonian crows to spontaneously solve this problem. This raises the possibil-
ity that these crows lack the ability to reason about invisible forces more generally, though
given the suggestive evidence that this species can reason about hidden causal agents ([33]; but
see [34–37]), and the weight discriminations made by birds trained to stone drop here, further
research is required. Caution is also required because of the role that ontogeny and experience
may play in the development of an understanding of force. While we tested 12 birds, of which
6 were adult, only two juveniles innovated stone dropping. While these two juveniles both
made the weight inattention error, it is possible that if an adult had innovated stone dropping,
it may have attended to weight. Similarly, it is possible that, if the crows had had more experi-
ence of force, either through increased experience of beak pushing, or from having to attend to
the force of their actions in other contexts, they might not have made the weight inattention
error. Thus further work is required before we can make any strong conclusions about the
crows’ use of an understanding of force outside of the specific context of innovating stone
dropping, where it is clear that such understanding is not necessary for this ‘insightful’ behav-
iour to emerge.
It is still unclear exactly what New Caledonian crows are thinking when innovating stone
dropping. One possibility is that the crows pick up objects close to the apparatus and insert
them into the tube in an attempt to increase their reach [38]. When they find the block is not a
sufficiently long tool they drop it, thus triggering the platform. Another possibility is that the
crows have an abstract concept of contact, in that they learn that contact between their beak
and the platform leads to reward, and then generalise this relationship to objects external to
their body. A third possibility is that the crows have a causal concept of contact, where they
understand that contact between their beak and the platform causes a specific effect: that the
platform will collapse and so lead to the release of food. Recent results suggesting that New
Caledonian crows are not capable of producing causal interventions provide some evidence
against this third possibility [39], though research is clearly needed to test between these
possibilities.
Our findings show how the signature-testing approach can allow us to make stronger infer-
ences about cognition than searching for ‘insight’. By designing experiments that explicitly
search for key cognitive signatures it is possible to constrain the types of cognitive mechanism
that could potentially be producing a behaviour. This can allow us to rule out cognitive mecha-
nisms that do not fit the patterns of observed signatures generated by a non-human animal. It
also allows us to make stronger inferences about whether different kinds of minds think in the
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same way. Searching for the weight inattention error in children and primates, for example,
would be a first step in examining how similar the cognition of these groups is to corvids
during ‘insightful’ problem solving. Such research offers a highly promising avenue for explor-
ing the degree to which intelligence evolves in a convergent manner across distantly related
species.
Supporting Information
S1 Data Set. Data set for the birds’ preferences and interactions with the heavy and light
blocks.
(XLSX)
S1 Video. Example of the weight inattention error. Video clip showing D4R showing the
weight inattention error. The subject initially drops a light block into the apparatus (which is
too light to collapse the platform) before dropping in a heavy block and causing the platform
to collapse.
(3GP)
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